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21. Introduction. The rise and fall of European mercantilism
At the start of the first millennium, Western Europe was the most peripheral
region within Eurasia. Like Africa, its exports largely consisted of forest products and
slaves, and it had direct economic links with just two other Eurasian regions, Eastern
Europe and the Islamic world. By contrast, the Muslim world had direct economic
contacts with all the regions of the then known world: Eastern and Western Europe, sub-
Saharan Africa, the steppe societies of central Asia, and the highly developed
civilisations of South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia (Findlay and O'Rourke 2007).
By the 18th century, Western Europe was no longer a peripheral appendage of the
Eurasian landmass, but had become geographically and politically central. It was now in
direct contact with all other regions of Eurasia, as well as with sub-Saharan Africa, but
more importantly controlled both North and South America, which were fully integrated
into the world economy, importing slaves from Africa, exporting a variety of colonial
goods to Europe, and exporting silver both to Europe and to Asia via the Philippines. As
for Eastern Europe, it was now in direct contact not just with central Asia and the Muslim
world, but with East Asia and North America as well, as a result of Russia's Siberian
conquests which would prove to be the most enduring of all the European imperialisms of
that time.
In contrast to China, which was relatively self-sufficient, European merchants and
states had a strong interest in seeking out direct routes to sub-Saharan gold deposits, thus
bypassing the Muslim middlemen to the who controlled the trans-Saharan trade;
purchasing African slaves, and using these on the sugar plantations of newly-discovered
offshore African islands; and ultimately in circumnavigating Africa, reaching Asian spice
markets directly, and again cutting out Muslim (and Venetian) middlemen. Once
Columbus stumbled upon the Americas, Europeans had every incentive to exploit the
vast resources of this New World as fully as possible. All of these activities were
extremely lucrative, and the mutual dependence of Power and Plenty (Viner 1948) meant
that states as well as merchants had a powerful motive to pursue them. Trade profited
merchants, but also yielded revenues to the state; while the state needed revenues to
secure trading opportunities for its merchants, by force if necessary. Trade and empire
3were thus inextricably linked in the minds of European statesman during the early
modern period, which explains the incessant mercantilist warfare of the time.
The 18th century saw the gradual rise to pre-eminence of Britain in this struggle
for power and plenty in the west, while Russia became dominant in the east. The Iberians
continued their hold on Latin America, but the 17th century saw Portugal being replaced
in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia by the Dutch. 1648 was an important turning
point, marking the end of the long-standing war between the Netherlands and Spain. This
freed up silver and soldiers, two essential "inputs" for the Dutch East India Company's
activities in Asia, and facilitated a series of conquests in Ceylon, on the Malabar coast,
and in the East Indies. By the late 17th century, the Dutch had succeeded in controlling
the supply of spices such as cloves, leading to a dramatic reduction in their exports, and
an end to Southeast Asia's "Age of Commerce". As Figure 4.1 shows, the Dutch
maintained their dominant position in the European-Asian seaborne trade until the end of
the 18th century. Meanwhile, the British found in India an abundant supply of several
commodities, notably cotton textiles, which they exported not only to Europe, but to
Africa and the Americas as well. By the third quarter of the 18th century, and after
military victories at Plassey in 1757, and Buxar in 1764, the English East India Company
was embarked on a path which would ultimately lead to dominion over the entire
subcontinent. After the Bengal mutiny of 1857, India formerly became part of the British
Empire.
In Western Europe, the triangular struggle for domination between the
Netherlands, France and England became a bilateral struggle between the latter two
powers following William of Orange's takeover of the British throne in 1688-1689.
England and France fought during the Nine Years War (1689-1697), the War of the
Spanish Succession (1701-1713), and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748).
The Seven Years War (1756-1763) was an important victory for Britain, which gained
control of France's North American possessions as well as several islands and ports in the
Caribbean and along the African and Indian coasts. In Eastern Europe, Russia under
Peter the Great and Catherine the Great was strengthening her position as a great
European power, defeating Sweden in the Great Northern War, absorbing the former
Grand Duchy of Lithuania and much of Poland, and expanding to the south at the
4expense of the Tartar Khanates and the Ottoman Empire. Russia had already expanded
eastwards as far as the Pacific by the middle of the 17th century; it now had secure
footholds on both the Baltic and Black seas.
All these European powers pursued a variety of mercantilists policies, designed to
enrich both the state and the local merchant class. These included protecting local
industries against foreign competition, protecting the local shipping industry by
preventing foreign merchants from trading with either the mother country or its colonies,
and a variety of policies designed to extract as much profit as possible from those
colonies. Empires yielded financial benefits by providing control over precious metal
supplies (in Latin America); giving access to abundant supplies of slaves (Africa);
allowing the cultivation of warm-climate crops such as tobacco and cotton, or trapping
furs in colder climates, and selling these on to consumers in Europe (the Americas and
North Asia); or allowing control over trade routes, or better yet the sources of supply of
scarce commodities such as spices (in Asia).
Such considerations were also present at the time of the Ottoman expansion into
Central and Eastern Europe, although the desire to spread Islam was another motivation,
just as spreading Christianity was a concern of the early Iberian explorers. Booty, control
over trade routes, and (in the 14th and 15th centuries) access to the silver mines of Serbia
and Macedonia were all important motives for the Turks, and indeed the prospect of
plunder can help to explain why many Christians fought on the Ottoman side.
Furthermore, the Ottomans actively intervened to prevent the Portuguese from obtaining
a monopoly of the spice trade in the Indian Ocean, fighting the interlopers both directly
along the Persian Gulf, and indirectly via their support for the sultan of Acheh, from
where pepper continued to be exported to Ottoman-held territory, and from there to
Venice. This allowed the Ottomans to continue enjoying the rents from the transit trade
until the appearance of the Dutch and English in the Indian Ocean in the 17th century.
The Ottomans were not mercantilists, in that they were not concerned with the interests
of domestic merchants or producers, and correctly understood that imports were
desirable, and that the fewer exports were needed to pay for these imports the better.
However, they were also sensitive to the mutual dependence of Power and Plenty, which
was a general feature of the Eurasian geopolitical landscape at a time when the Military
5Revolution was making warfare more expensive, and reducing the number of states that
were militarily viable at any given time.
This mercantilist system was swept away in the early 19th century as a result of
technological and geopolitical change. Paradoxically, the beginning of the end occurred
in North America, partly at least as a result of British successes there. As a number of
observers predicted following the end of the Seven Years War, without a French presence
threatening the British colonists there, those colonists would now find it easier to press
for independence from the mother country. The fiscal crisis which the conflict gave rise
to provided one trigger for the American Revolution, which ended with the Peace of Paris
in 1783. French involvement was crucial for the rebellion's success, but this in turn led to
a fiscal crisis in France which again was one of the triggers leading to revolution there.
When war between Britain and France broke out yet again in 1793, it now had an
additional ideological dimension adding to the severity and duration of the conflict,
which only finally ended with the French defeat at Waterloo in 1815. By that time,
Napoleon's invasion of Iberia in 1807 had been followed by a series of revolutions in
Latin America, and by the 1820s independent republics (or an empire in the case of
Brazil), had been established across the continent. Apart from Spanish Cuba and Puerto
Rico, and British Canada, virtually nothing remained of Europe's New World empires.
While these newly independent nations adopted highly protectionist policies during the
19th century, those tariffs would be imposed in the context of a broadly multilateral
international trading system, in which there were no more bilateral mercantilist
restrictions on trade.
Several other factors promoted globalisation between 1815 and 1870. The post-
war settlement, ushered in by the Congress of Vienna, led to a remarkably durable peace
in Europe. Despite the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian war, and a number of smaller
conflicts, and despite the fact that the period ended with the disaster of the Great War, the
century after Waterloo was a peaceful one by European standards. The new transport
technologies of the Industrial Revolution, described in Chapter 1.8, dramatically reduced
transport costs. Geopolitically, new industrial military technologies increased the relative
power of Europe and her most important overseas offshoot, the United States. The half-
century following Waterloo saw major European imperial advances in India, North
6Africa and elsewhere, as well as the infamous Opium Wars which forcibly opened
Chinese markets to trade. Meanwhile, the United States expanded overland across North
America, while Russia continued to expand in Asia. European states forced more or less
free trade on their Imperial possessions or on nominally independent nations such as
China, Japan and Siam.
The period also saw a gradual move towards trade liberalisation in Europe. Early
liberalisers were typically smaller countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark. The
latter country had abolished import prohibitions and adopted low tariffs as early as 1797,
while the Dutch moved to a relatively liberal trade policy in 1819, having seen the Dutch
East India Company being destroyed during the war. The first major economy to
liberalise was Britain, where power was shifting to export-oriented urban interests.
Liberal reforms in the 1820s and 1830s were followed by Robert Peel's historic decision
to abolish the Corn Laws in 1846, and move the United Kingdom to a unilateral policy of
agricultural and industrial free trade, against the objections of landlords and much of his
own Tory party. There followed further moves towards liberalisation in countries such as
Austria-Hungary, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway and Denmark
(Bairoch 1989, pp. 20-36). For example, in 1849 Spain abolished its navigation laws and
suppressed prohibitive tariffs, and the Spanish went on to liberalise imports of inputs into
railway construction in the mid-1850s. Average tariffs were falling throughout the 1850s
in the major European powers (Accominotti and Flandreau 2006).
Trade liberalisation was not universal. Russia and Austria-Hungary remained
extremely protectionist throughout almost all the period, only liberalising slightly in the
late 1860s. The Ottoman Empire actually became more protectionist during the period,
not less, although this is explained by the fact that it had previously been limited to a
maximum 3% tariff as a result of various treaties signed with Western European powers.
In 1838, the Turks obtained the right to raise their tariffs to 5%, but at the cost of
abolishing all monopolies and prohibitions. Overall, however, the period between
Waterloo and 1870 was one in which both trade policy and technology were integrating
international commodity markets. The switch from mercantilism to modernity was now
complete.
72. Quantitative trends, 1700-1870
2.1. Trade volumes
Using the shipping data in Figure 4.1, Jan de Vries (2003) estimates that the
tonnage returned from Asia to Europe grew at 1.01% per annum during the 16th century,
1.24% during the 17th, 1.16% during the 18th, and at 1.1% over the three centuries as a
whole. O'Rourke and Williamson (2002a), using a more eclectic mix of data, calculate
average growth rates per annum of European trade with both Asia and the Americas of
1.26% during the 16th century, 0.66% during the 17th, 1.26% during the 18th, and 1.06%
per annum overall. An average growth rate of roughly 1% per annum over a period of
three centuries was an impressive achievement relative to what had gone before, and led
to Europe, or at least the maritime powers of Western Europe, becoming more open,
albeit from very low levels. According to Maddison (2003), Western European GDP
grew at roughly 0.4% per annum between 1500 and 1820, implying rising ratios of
intercontinental trade to GDP.2 As a result, trade with Asia, Africa and America was a
very important share of European trade in 1790 (Table 4.1).
The wars of 1792-1815 and the Industrial Revolution were a turning point for
European trade, dramatically increasing the relative importance of the United Kingdom
(contrast Table 4.1 and Table.2 with Table 4.54.3), and reducing European trade to GDP
ratios. Both phenomena are partly explained by the fact that pre-1800 trade to GDP ratios
were inflated by entrepôt trade (Table 4.4.4) which declined following the end of the
“first” French and Iberian colonial empires and the collapse of the Dutch East India
Company. Trade started growing again during the 1830s. Between 1820 and 1870, the
volume of trade grew ninefold (Table 4.5) and the European trade to GDP ratio more than
doubled.
2.2. Commodity market integration
Perhaps surprisingly, the increase in early modern trade volumes between Europe
and the rest of the world was not accompanied by commodity price convergence, at least
according to the data that have been analysed up to now (O'Rourke and Williamson
2002b). Figure 4.2 shows that the ratio of the Amsterdam to the Asian prices for pepper
2 The Maddison figures probably represent an upper bound, given the lower growth figures (around 0.1%
per annum) calculated by van Zanden (2005) and Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2007).
8and cloves did not fall before the 19th century, and there was substantial price divergence
for cloves in the 1650s, coinciding with the establishment of Dutch control over clove
supplies around that time. Mercantilist policies could have directly prevented price
convergence during this period, as the figures for cloves suggest, but mercantilism also
created an international political environment in which wars were frequent, and this was
perhaps the key factor preventing long run price convergence. Peaks in the clove price
gaps during the first and second Anglo-Dutch wars, the Seven Years War, and the wars
of 1792-1815, lend credence to this view. More systematic price evidence is available for
the latter conflict, and shows clearly that warfare led to a dramatic, worldwide
disintegration of commodity markets (O'Rourke 2006). For example, the price of wheat
rose by over 40% during 1807-14 relative to textiles in Britain, which imported wheat
and exported textiles, but it fell in France, which was a wheat exporter and cotton textile
importer. Similarly the price of raw cotton rose relative to textiles in Europe, but fell
substantially in the United States.
Figure 4.2 shows dramatic price convergence between Southeast Asia and the
Netherlands once the wars had ended, and a vast array of evidence documents
international price convergence more generally during the 19th century. Figure 4.3
shows that while the Anglo-American wheat price gap fluctuated widely before 1840 or
so, around a roughly constant trend, it started to drop dramatically after that date,
coinciding with the commencement of large-scale shipments of wheat between United
States and Britain. Jacks (2005, p. 399) concludes that there is evidence of a "truly
international market for wheat from around 1835". This evidence (cf. Federico and
Persson 2007) is important, since it shows that international price convergence
characterised the 19th century as a whole, not just the years after 1870.
Another important change after 1800 concerns the types of commodities which
could be transported profitably between continents. As Table 4.6 shows, European
imports from the rest of the world before then were mostly high value-to-weight ratio
commodities, which could bear the cost of transport because they were not produced in
Europe at all, or only with some difficulty. There was a gradual evolution, to be sure.
During the 16th century, silver and spices were the dominant imports from the Americas
and Asia respectively. Around the middle of the 17th century Indian textiles became the
9leading European import from Asia, but the European textile industry was still
uncompetitive relative to Indian weavers. Around the same time, "colonial goods" such
as sugar and tobacco were becoming important New World exports, but these were w-
climate commodities that could not be easily grown in Western Europe. There was thus
an evolution in the nature of intercontinental trade during the early modern period,
towards bulkier commodities, but the period before 1800 did not, for the most part,
involve large scale intercontinental trade in basic, heavy commodities such as wheat
which could be easily grown both inside and outside Europe.
The new transport technologies of the 19th century meant that such basic,
"competing" commodities could indeed be shipped across the oceans of the world.
European prices for temperate climate agricultural commodities now started to reflect
American, Australian and Russian factor endowments rather than demand and supply in
Western Europe alone, implying that, in line with Heckscher-Ohlin logic, cheap overseas
food started to place European land rents under pressure (O'Rourke and Williamson
2005). This would only become important in the years after 1870, when these
Heckscher-Ohlin forces would have important political repercussions. However, the
seeds of that retreat from globalization were sown in the half century following Waterloo.
3. Trade, empire and growth
3.1. Introduction
Aggregate evidence suggests that trade was positively associated with growth in
Europe during the 17th and 18th centuries. Both the urbanisation rate and GDP grew
more rapidly in the "Atlantic" European economies (England, France, the Netherlands,
Portugal and Spain) than in the rest of Western Europe or Asia between 1500 and 1800
(Acemoglu et al 2005, Maddison 2003). Allen (2003) also finds a strong positive
relationship between trade and growth in Europe during this period, concluding that "the
intercontinental trade boom was a key development that propelled north-western Europe
forwards" (p. 432).
It is less clear what the mechanisms were linking trade with economic growth.
Different authors, discussing the impact of trade on various European countries, tend to
assume different mechanisms, while to make matters even more complicated the
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literature very often (if understandably, given the realities of mercantilism) conflates two
conceptually distinct issues, namely the impact of trade in general, and the effects of
countries’ colonial policies. In what follows, we therefore look at the mechanisms
through which, it has been suggested, trade might have influenced growth. We then
consider the link between imperialism per se and economic welfare, using the Iberian
loss of its Latin American colonies as a "natural experiment". Finally, we take a more
detailed look at the various links between trade and the central economic event of this
period, the British Industrial Revolution.
3.2. Mechanisms
How might trade have affected growth during this period? One crucial issue is
whether or not all resources in the economy were fully employed. With full employment,
allocating resources to exports had an opportunity cost, as they could alternatively have
been used in production for the domestic market. While a "comparative advantage"
perspective leads to the conclusion that trade was beneficial for economies, it also tends
to imply that the gains involved were small (since the Harberger triangles measuring the
gains of moving to free trade from some protectionist equilibrium are small relative to the
size of the overall economy). Thus Thomas and McCloskey (1981) among others
conclude that if the British economy had been shut off from trade at the time of the
Industrial Revolution, it would have produced a lot less cotton, but a lot more of other
commodities, and sustained only a small welfare loss.
An alternative Smithian "vent for surplus" perspective assumes that resources in
many 18th century economies were unemployed, or at least, underemployed, and that
trade could bring these resources into productive (or more productive) employment at
little or no opportunity cost. In this case, trade would have a bigger effect on economic
growth, as O'Brien and Engerman (1991) argue for the British case. Faced with these two
alternatives, some researchers have adopted the eclectic solution of providing upper
(unemployment) and lower (full employment) bounds for the impact of trade or empire
on particular economies. Nevertheless, both approaches tend to produce small numbers,
with the estimated contribution of empire or trade to growth remaining modest compared
with the expansion of the domestic market. This is not surprising, since both approaches
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are essentially static, whereas economic growth is a dynamic process, involving both
capital accumulation and technological change.
While any rigorous assessment of the impact of trade on economic growth
requires specifying a theoretical model, be it static or dynamic, many traditional
economic historians have preferred to give qualitative accounts emphasising the impact
of trade on particular regions or sectors. In the case of 18th century France, for example,
Butel and Crouzet (1998) have depicted imperial expansion in (and thus trade with)
America and Asia as a non-negligible contribution to growth, that was however
concentrated both by region -- in the Atlantic ports (Bordeaux, Nantes, Le Havre) and
their immediate hinterlands -- and by sector. Colonies represented a significant market
for French industry, since they accounted for 45% of the total increase in manufactured
exports during the 18th century. While such figures should be tempered by the fact that
on the eve of the French Revolution exports only represented 7% of industrial output, and
colonial exports even less (only 2.5%), the impact of these exports was concentrated in a
few sectors (linen especially), implying proportionately greater effects there. Similarly,
around 15% of Portuguese linen output was exported to Brazil in the early 19th century
(Pedreira 1993). Butel and Crouzet also stress the feedbacks from colonial trade to non-
exporting industries, including sugar refining, shipbuilding and its ancillary activities, as
well as to the shipping industry, since transportation was on French ships.
In the case of Spain, trade with America increased between 1714 and 1796,
especially during the late 18th century, promoting monetisation and market orientation at
a time of growing population pressure and rising land rents. Trade stimulated industry
and services, in particular shipbuilding and its associated activities (iron, timber and
cordage industries). Exports to the colonies benefited some industries and regions, but
the small share of industrial goods and commercial services supplied to Latin America by
Iberian firms and merchants before the break up of their empires stands in contrast to the
linkages forged between the British economy and her overseas territories and markets.
Monetisation, the commercialisation of agriculture and the stimulus of particular
industries, such as the iron industry, are also seen as major benefits of foreign trade in
Russia during this period (Kahan 1985).
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Recent research has downplayed Spanish gains from colonial trade (Prados de la
Escosura 1993). The composition of trade suggests that the possibility of increasing
production by reallocating resources was small, and that most gains possibly resulted
from changing consumption patterns. By 1792, over 60% of retained imports consisted
of cocoa and sugar. Furthermore, these colonial products could have been acquired on
international markets. Consequently, gains from colonial trade would only occur if,
given colonial rule, Spain acquired the same commodities at lower prices. Furthermore,
Spain's dependence on the colonies for raw materials was very small (raw cotton and
dyestuffs only represented 4% of retained imports in 1792). This is of course a measure
of the weakness of domestic manufacturing. In the Catalan cotton textile industry (one of
the most dynamic industries at the end of the 18th century), European cotton yarn imports
were more important than colonial raw cotton imports, suggesting how weak the Catalan
spinning industry was at the time.
Industrial exports, concentrated in a few sectors (textiles: 36.6% in 1792; iron and
steel: 3.2%; paper: 4.4%; and food: 22.3%) stimulated industrial expansion and were
associated with some external economies in their regions of origin. Colonial protectionist
legislation made Spanish manufactures artificially competitive on the Spanish American
market. An upper bound computation suggests that exports of domestic manufactures to
the colonies made a 5% contribution to industrial value added before the Napoleonic
Wars (ibid).
One way of gauging the importance of overseas trade to the economies of
Western Europe is to see what happened when the trade between Continental Europe and
the Americas was suppressed by British blockades after 1807. Crouzet (1964, p. 571)
presents a vivid picture of a deindustrializing Western European seaboard during this
period: "Harbors were deserted, grass was growing in the streets, and in large towns like
Amsterdam, Bordeaux, and Marseilles, population did actually decrease..." Industries
which particularly suffered included shipbuilding, and those processing colonial raw
materials such as sugar and tobacco. A variety of food-processing industries were also
badly affected, as well as cotton printing, but the most important victim was the linen
industry in regions like Western France, Flanders, Holland and Germany. According to
Crouzet (p. 573), the damage done to the outward-oriented Atlantic economy of
13
Continental Western Europe was permanent. On the other hand, trade disruption also led
to the development of import substituting industries protected from British competition
by wartime blockades, notably the cotton textile industry. To repeat, in a world with
scarce resources which can be transferred from one activity to another, there is a limit to
how great can be the static welfare losses associated with trade disruption, unless one
assumes asymmetries across sectors (for example, associated with externalities:
Engerman 1998).
Daudin (2006) abandons this essentially static perspective in favour of a more
dynamic one, focused on profits and capital accumulation. The question he addresses is
the extent to which colonial profits contributed to capital formation in France before the
Revolution. Net re-invested profits linked to the overseas sector represented up to 6% of
French savings, and were responsible for approximately 7% of French GDP per capita
growth between 1715 and 1790. This implies that by 1790 GDP would have been only
3% smaller in their absence. However, a further conjectural exercise (Daudin 2004),
assuming that high overseas profits encouraged investment throughout the economy,
suggests that they might have been responsible for as much as one-third of French
growth.
A very different mechanism linking trade and growth was proposed by Voltaire
more than two centuries ago. He argued that Britain's success in trade and the freedom of
her constitution mutually reinforced each other in a virtuous circle: "trade, which has
made richer the citizens of England, has helped to make them free, and this freedom has,
in turn, enlarged trade" (cited in Findlay and O'Rourke 2007, p. 347). Similarly,
Acemoglu et al. (2005) claim that Atlantic trade strengthened the political power of
merchants, who obtained a strengthening of property rights in consequence. According
to these authors, these beneficial political consequences of trade did not occur in states
which had initially been more absolutist than, say, Britain, and there is a case to be made
that imperialism strengthened rather than weakened absolutist monarchs in Iberia at this
time. In early modern Europe state power was constrained by the Crown's needs to raise
taxes. The more kings depended on taxes, the less sovereign and autonomous they
became. Colonial revenues allowed the rise of a strong political centre which
concentrated power without being drawn into extensive bargaining with its more
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prominent subjects and institutions. In Portugal, the tax on gold accounted for some 10%
of public revenue in 1716, while by the 1760s, just before the gold and diamond mines
started to decline, it provided a fifth of state receipts. Brazil supplied around 40% of
government tax returns at the time of the Marquis of Pombal. In Spain, prior to the
Napoleonic wars, Crown revenues of colonial origin (including the surplus from colonial
chests and those derived from customs duties) represented one-fourth of the total. In
Spain, as in Portugal, bullion not only underpinned regal power but augmented the
incomes of the aristocracy, and thereby reduced their need to increase taxation and rents
from the population. Thus, the colonial empire helped to consolidate and stabilise
traditional institutions and structures of power, status and property rights within Iberia,
implying comparatively few representative institutions there.
The emancipation of the American colonies at the start of the 19th century
marked the end of the Iberian Ancien Regime, and opened the way to liberal revolutions
in Spain and Portugal with implications for the economic development and international
position of Iberia that have remained largely unexplored. Accounts of economic
backwardness in 19th century Iberia have often placed the blame on the loss of empire,
but this may in fact have contributed significantly to the economic and social
modernisation of the peninsula.
3.3. Empires and welfare
The question of why European countries chose to build empires has long been
controversial. Several hypotheses have been proposed, ranging from the purely economic
to the purely political, with several intermediate cases as well. Among the more
economic explanations is the Vinerian view which we have already encountered that in
the absence of integrated international markets, caused largely by insecurity in an age of
widespread piracy and warfare, overseas expansion permitted the creation of reserved
markets, thus intertwining conquest and trade. If Spanish merchants, say, were to be able
to trade in a given area, the Spanish government would have to make this possible by
excluding other merchants and governments from that area, since otherwise the Spanish
would themselves be excluded. This is not to deny that a generally free trading situation
would have been preferable to one in which each country pursued a mercantilist strategy,
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which might have been individually rational, from a military or even economic
viewpoint, but which produced a collectively suboptimal outcome. From a historical
point of view however one can ask: is this a realistic counterfactual, in a world without a
collective security regime? Findlay and O'Rourke (2007, p.229) argue that for the
individual European state, pondering what such a unilateral conversion to peaceful free
trade might bring, "in the absence of... a clearly defined hegemonic power, military
defeat and exclusion from foreign markets” seems a plausible answer.
Other less economic explanations for empire have also been proposed. For
example, in response to the question as to why, once the technological constraints that
impeded long-distance oceanic voyages had been removed, only some European
countries established colonies overseas, Elliott (1990) proposed an explanation based on
previous histories of expansion. Iberian plunder, settlement, and colonisation in the
Americas, in this view, represented a follow-up to the reconquest ("reconquista") of
territories previously under Muslim control, while England's overseas expansion in the
17th century followed the conquest of Ireland in the previous century. Why did other
countries in Europe eventually join them? Here Elliott points to competition between
European nation-states, which triggered an emulation process leading to the seizure and
occupation of New World lands. In this scenario, the fact that all of Europe ultimately
became involved in overseas expansion was at least in part unintended.
Another view points to the interconnections between empire and nation-state
building, with countries in Europe struggling not to be left behind. This interpretation
regards as economistic and anachronistic the view that states and merchants needed
reserved markets and supply sources in an uncertain world, and regards colonies not as an
investment, but rather as costs paid for non-economic ends (Engerman 1998). The costs
of empire are undeniable, since colonies needed to be acquired, settled, and defended.
Wars, losses of life and ships represented -- from a purely economic perspective -- a
diversion of resources from alternative uses. War costs had to be financed through taxes,
inflation or public debt. Besides, the colonial system involved navigation laws that
imposed an implicit tax on consumers, as they usually had to pay a price above that of the
most efficient producer.
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A recurring theme in the Iberian literature is whether Portugal and Spain did not
develop because, in building their empires, the metropolitan economy was disregarded.
Did empires represent a significant opportunity cost, absorbing resources that could have
been allocated to productive investment (Fontana 1991), or were such costs a prerequisite
for economic development? In order to realise the potential inherent in the discovery of
the resource-abundant but labour-scarce Americas, the Iberian powers required
continuous investment in social overhead capital (ports, roads, housing, internal
transportation, and oceanic shipping) and the establishment of new political and
commercial organisations. This task was mainly undertaken by Iberians, while benefiting
the rest of Europe, for at least 150 years after Columbus (O'Brien and Prados de la
Escosura 1998). In the case of Portugal, it might be argued that emigration deprived the
country of manpower, skills and entrepreneurship, since emigrants were young males,
and more literate and ambitious than average. On the other hand, emigration made
possible the colonisation of new territories, opening new markets and providing luxuries
and tropical groceries at lower cost. Furthermore, emigration eased economic conditions
in the more densely populated areas, especially in the northwest.
Ironically, in the light of this literature, it may be the flow of resources from the
Americas to Iberia that did the most damage to the Spanish and Portuguese economies in
the long run. First, as we have already seen, bullion flows strengthened absolutist
monarchies and central governments, with damaging political and economic
consequences. Second, the inflow of specie, gold in Portugal and silver in Spain, may
have provoked a "Dutch disease" of sorts, damaging the competitiveness of local
manufacturing industries (Forsyth and Nicholas 1983; Drelichman 2005).
One way of assessing the importance of empire to the Iberian economies is to
explore what happened after the loss of those empires. By 1827, once Brazil had severed
her links to Portugal and declared full independence, real Portuguese domestic exports
represented just two thirds of their average level in 1796/1806. However, this conceals a
switch from industrial to agricultural exports, with Portugal reorienting its economy
towards Britain by selling its primary produce in exchange for manufactures, within the
context of improving terms of trade. Trade in services also suffered, with re-exports
contracting by one fifth in real terms between the same dates. For example, Portugal
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could no longer be an entrepôt for the produce of Brazil. Pedreira (1993) suggests that the
loss of Brazil implied an upper bound loss of 8% of GDP. A widespread consensus views
Portugal as being now confined to the role of supplier of foodstuffs and raw materials,
with no opportunities to specialise within the more dynamic industrial sector. However,
since the old colonial system did not bring Portugal to the verge of modern
industrialisation, its breakdown can hardly be blamed for the country's failure to
subsequently industrialise.
In contrast to Great Britain and the thirteen North American colonies, where
commercial links were immediately and vigorously renewed after their independence
(Shepherd and Walton 1976), Spain and the new Latin American republics practically cut
ties (except for the trade using Cuba as an entrepôt). From the beginning of the war with
Britain in October 1796, Spain maintained almost no link with the colonies for more than
two decades. The subsequent decline in domestic exports (roughly 25% between 1784/96
and 1815/20) can be attributed almost exclusively to the fall in colonial commerce (which
shrank by 40%). The consequence was the end of the long-standing equilibrium
distribution of domestic exports between the colonies and Europe (roughly one-third and
two-thirds, respectively), and the establishment of a new distribution that continued
throughout the 19th century (with foreign markets absorbing four-fifths). Retained
imports of colonial goods for domestic consumption (which had represented one-third of
total retained imports) were halved , but this was offset by imports from Europe. The
collapse of trade with the empire was particularly significant for services (financial,
insurance, transportation), as is revealed by the contraction of real re-exports by three-
fifths between 1784/96 and 1815/20. The Spanish balance of trade also felt the effects of
colonial independence. Before the loss of empire, Spain had a deficit on current account
with foreign countries that was balanced by a corresponding surplus in colonial trade.
With colonial emancipation this balancing mechanism disappeared, with deflationary
consequences for the domestic economy. Fortunately, a favourable terms of trade –
resulting from an improvement vis-à-vis Europe, more than matching a deterioration with
respect to the colonies -- increased the purchasing power per unit of exports by 20%
between 1784/96 and 1815/20, allowing Spain to avoid further deterioration in the
current account balance.
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Prados de la Escosura (1993) has attempted a rough estimate of the real cost to
Spain of the loss of her colonies, making assumptions favourable to the generally
accepted view that the loss was significant. The first assumption is that the productive
resources embodied in exportables did not have alternative uses in the domestic
economy. A similar assumption is made regarding the services (shipping, insurance,
mercantile) provided by Spanish subjects in the colonial trade. In contrast to the non-
colonial trade, almost totally carried on non-Spanish ships, Spanish colonial legislation
ensured that the Indies trade used only national shipping. Therefore, with the decline of
Spanish American trade, a decline in Spanish maritime services closely followed. The
loss in revenues due to the cessation of precious metal shipments, and the reduction of
customs duties resulting from colonial independence, were also taken into account, the
assumption being that public revenues from the colonies were productively used in the
domestic economy. The upper bound estimate of Spanish losses implied by these
assumptions was not more than 8% of national income. And while it could be argued that
the profits from colonial trade represented a high proportion of the funds used to finance
investment in Spain, an upper bound estimate of their contribution made to total capital
formation is below 18% by 1784/96.
The long term consequences of the loss of the colonies depended on the flexibility
and dynamic nature of the industry concerned. The decline in manufactured exports from
many sectors illustrates the lack of competitiveness of Spanish industries: Spain could not
offer the Latin American consumer either the prices or the quality of her Western
European competitors, specifically Great Britain. For example, the Basque iron and steel
industry (which sold at least a third of its output to colonial markets at the end of the 18th
century) became uncompetitive from the 1770s onward. A similar situation characterised
the Valencia silk industry. Between the 1790s and the 1820s net exports of raw silk rose
while net imports of silk textiles increased. Catalan shipping was yet another industry
which had grown under colonial protection and suffered afterwards. However, Catalan
cotton textiles developed further once the colonial market had been lost. The more
competitive and flexible sectors of the economy eventually adapted to new circumstance,
particularly commercial agriculture which turned towards growing markets in Western
Europe. As mentioned earlier, the 19th century was a good time to do this, in that the
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terms of trade moved favourably for agricultural producers, with technological progress
lowering the prices of industrial goods and growing demand raising relative agricultural
prices (Figure 4.4). The loss of the colonies had a less profound and widespread impact
upon the Spanish economy than the historical literature has suggested.
3.4. Trade and the Industrial Revolution
Chapter 1 provided a broad overview of Europe’s transition to modern economic
growth. We now focus on one particular aspect of this transition, and ask: what was the
impact of trade and empire on the British Industrial Revolution? The literature on this
issue has largely been shaped by the dominant economic theories of the day. One
particularly influential strand of thought has been inspired by the assumption of Classical
economists, from Smith to Marx, that growth depends on investment, which depends on
savings, which depends on profits (since workers were assumed to be too poor to save,
and landlords too frivolous). In a famous book, Eric Williams (1966) argued that
Atlantic slave trade profits financed the Industrial Revolution. His largely anecdotal
evidence consisted of enumerating cases in which those associated with slavery made
investments in domestic British industry. The classic quantitative responses to Williams
were made by Engerman (1972) and O’Brien (1982), both of whom measured the profits
associated with the slave trade (or, in the case of O’Brien, with Britain’s trans-oceanic
activities more generally), and found these to have been too small to have possibly
mattered. For example, O’Brien found that the total profits accruing to those engaged in
trade and commerce with the ‘periphery’ in 1784-86 amounted to £5.66 million. If 30%
of these profits were saved and reinvested, then that would have financed roughly 15% of
British gross investment during that period. Since 15% was, for O’Brien, a small figure,
the Williams thesis ‘foundered on the numbers’ (p. 16).
There is a more fundamental problem with the Williams thesis, which is that as
we saw in Chapter 1, technological change rather than capital accumulation was the
driving force behind the Industrial Revolution. By focussing on profits as the possible
link between overseas trade, empire and slavery on the one hand, and European growth
on the other, Williams and others have been barking up the wrong channel. If Marxist
economic theory is ill-suited to explain the Industrial Revolution, so too is Keynesian
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theory, by definition, since Keynes was concerned with the short run determination of
output and employment, not with long run economic growth. This has not prevented
various historians from attempting to argue that overseas demand exogenously boosted
British industrial output during the transition to modern growth. As almost 60% of British
cotton textile exports went to non-European countries during 1784-6 (Davis 1979), such a
claim is understandable. However, growth is ultimately a supply-side phenomenon, and
indeed if growth had been due to rising overseas demand, then Britain’s terms of trade
should have increased during the Industrial Revolution, whereas in fact they fell,
reflecting the cost-reducing nature of the innovations concerned (McCloskey 1981,
Mokyr 1977). Figure 4.5 makes the point in a simple manner. According to Crafts and
Harley (1992), industrial output rose by roughly 235% between 1780 and 1831, while
GDP rose by roughly 135%. If the income-elasticity of demand was unity, and foreign
incomes rose at the same rate as British ones, then the demand for British manufactures at
constant prices rose by roughly 135%. This can be illustrated by the outward shift of
demand from D to D’ (ignore D” and D”’ for now). If the industrial supply curve were
vertical, it would have shifted out by 235%, intersecting D’ at the new equilibrium,
denoted by point B. The available data on the British terms of trade suggest that at this
point, relative manufactured goods prices were (very roughly speaking) 55% lower than
in the initial equilibrium A. If the elasticity of supply were unity, on the other hand, the
supply curve would have shifted out (at constant prices) by 290% (=135+100+55), far
more than the 135% outward shift in demand.
Findlay (1990) provides a simple general equilibrium model of the late 18th
century Atlantic economy which, although it is static, can still help in thinking about how
trade really mattered during the Industrial Revolution. That revolution was initially
heavily concentrated in cotton textiles, and British imports of raw cotton came
exclusively from outside Europe, and particularly from the Americas. The American
supply was highly elastic, as a result of the then seemingly limitless endowment of New
World land, and the highly elastic supply of slave labour. The Industrial Revolution
meant a large increase in the demand for raw cotton, and hence a rise in its price at home
and abroad, implying a deterioration in Britain’s terms of trade. High American supply
elasticities minimised this terms of trade loss – in the absence of slaves and New World
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land, relative raw cotton prices would have increased by more than they actually did,
potentially choking off growth in this crucial sector. The existence of overseas markets
also implied a higher demand for cotton textiles, and a more elastic demand as well. As
can be seen from Figure 4.5, a given supply shift due to industrial innovation would have
had a smaller output effect, and reduced cotton textiles prices by even more than was
actually the case, with inelastic demand (compare the shift from D to D’ with the shift
from D’’ to D’’’).
Not only did trade ensure that a given supply side impulse travelled further; it also
probably ensured more innovation, which was both motivated by profits and expensive
(Allen 2006). Large fixed research and development costs implied that innovators had to
make profits just to break even, and larger markets helped innovators recoup those fixed
costs. Furthermore, under certain circumstances larger markets imply more elastic
demand curves for individual monopolistically competitive firms (Desmet and Parente
2006). Thus a given price-reducing innovation will imply larger sales and revenue
increases in larger markets, meaning that as markets expand, innovation becomes more
likely. While this mechanism has yet to be quantified, presumably a closed Britain (even
a closed Britain miraculously enabled to grow cotton) would not have experienced as
much innovation as was in fact observed. Unlike China or the Mughal Empire, it was too
small to rely on its domestic markets. As it was, increases in exports were equivalent to
21% of the total increase in GDP between 1780 and 1801 Crafts (1985, p. 131), over 50%
of additional industrial output during the same period (Cuenca Esteban 1997), and over
60% of additional textiles output between 1815 and 1841 (Harley 1999, p. 187).
Furthermore, by the late 18th century manufacturing was spreading across
Western Europe, and English manufacturers were finding themselves increasingly
excluded from markets in Germany, France, Sweden and elsewhere (Davis 1962). Not
surprisingly, therefore, between 1780 and 1801 the Americas accounted for roughly 60%
of additional British exports (O’Brien and Engerman 1991, p. 186). British innovators
were largely dependent on overseas markets as their industries expanded. The
implication, in a mercantilist world in which nations systematically excluded their
enemies from protected markets, is that British military success over the French and other
European rivals was one ingredient in explaining her subsequent rise to economic
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prominence: certainly not a sufficient condition, since domestic conditions had to be right
in order to spur innovation in the first place, but possibly a necessary one.
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Table 4.1. European trade c. 1790 (£ million)
Imports Exports
Re-
exports
Re-
exports
Total
Share
ROW
From
Europe
From
ROW
Toward
Europe
Toward
ROW
Toward
Europe
Toward
ROW
Britain (1784/86)
(Including trade
with Ireland)
11.3 11.5 6.3 7.3 2.8 0.8 40.0 49%
France (1787) 12.8 11.7 9.7 5.3 6.0 0.4 45.9 38%
Netherlands (using
1770 trade
composition)
9.3 3.6
8.3
(incl.
re-X)
0.7
(incl.
re -X)
3.8 (colonial goods)
2.4 (European goods)
21.9 20%
Spain (1788/92)
(ROW: America)
3.6 2.0 3.5 1.9 1.4 2.2 19.0 36%
Portugal
(1796/1800)
(ROW: Brazil)
4.1 2.9 1.4 1.3 3.9 1.4 15.3 35%
Sources: See Table 4.3 , and Pedreira (1993), Cuenca-Esteban (1989); Marshall (1833)
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Table 4.2. European merchant fleet c. 1790
Tons Percentage
UK 881,963 26.2%
France 729,340 21.6%
Netherlands 397,709 11.8%
Denmark and Norway 386,020 11.4%
Italy, Trieste and Ragusa 352,713 10.5%
Sweden 169,279 5.0%
Spain 149,460 4.4%
Portugal 84,843 2.5%
Russia 39,394 1.2%
Total 3,372,09 100%
Source: Romano (1962)
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Table 4.3. Exports plus imports as share of GDP
c. 1655 c. 1720 c. 1755 c. 1790 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870
Austria 11.4% 14.2% 13.2% 18.7% 29.0%
Belgium 19.0% 26.7% 31.3% 35.6%
Denmark 7.5% 17.5% 27.5% 36.5% 29.7% 35.7%
Finland 20.7% 31.7%
France 5.5% 14% 20% 9.8% 8.2% 10.7% 13.0% 20.2% 23.6%
Germany 19.2% 23.2% 36.8%
Greece 42.7% 45.6%
Hungary 19.4%
Italy 16.1% 18.3%
Netherlands 85% 82% 84% 110% 33.0% 25.8% 53.4% 64.0% 96.4% 115.4%
Norway 33.9%
Portugal 42.4% 33.9% 33.7%
Spain 16% 6.0% 7.3% 11.2% 11.7%
Sweden 5.7% 6.8% 13.8% 20.0% 29.4%
UK 19% 20% 24% 21.4% 18.8% 25.2% 27.8% 41.8% 43.6%
Best guess at total European trade
to GDP ratio
13.4% 11.4% 15.4% 18.0% 24.9% 29.9%
Idem, net of intra-European trade 3.8% 6.3% 8.9% 9.2%
Notes: Ottoman Empire, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Serbia are not included in total Europe. “UK”
pre-1800 is just England and Wales.
Sources: Post-1800: Bairoch (1976), and data underlying Prados de la Escosura (2000). Pre-1800: Deane
and Cole (1962 (1969)), Davis (1969, 1979), Officer (2001), Crafts (1985), Maddison (2001), de Vries and
van der Woude (1997), McCusker (1978), Arnould (1791), Daudin (2005), Marczewski (1961), Prados
de la Escosura (1993).
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Table 4.4. Entrepôt and special trade (£ million)
Retained imports (1) = total
imports – Re-exports
Domestic exports
(2) Re-exports (3)
Special trade (4)
= (1)+(2)
Special trade as a
share of total trade
=
100*(4)/[(4)+(3)+(3)]
Britain (1784/86) 19.2 13.6 3.6 32.8 82%
France (1787) 18.1 15.0 6.4 33.1 72%
Netherlands (using 1770 trade
composition)
6.7 9.0 6.2 15.7 43%
Spain (1788/92) 6.4 5.4 3.6 11.8 62%
Portugal (1796/1800) 2.0 2.7 5.3 4.7 31%
Note: retained imports are computed assuming that the value of a good is recorded identically when it is
imported and when it is re-exported. Special trade excludes both re-exports and non-retained imports.
Source: see Tables 4.1, 4.3.
Table 4.5. European real trade 1820-1870
1820
(million 1990 $) Growth 1820-1870
Austria 47 +894%
Belgium 92 +1,245%
France 487 +621%
Italy 339 +427%
Spain 137 +550%
Switzerland 147 +653%
UK 1125 +988%
Weighted average +793%
US 251 +12,010%
Source: Maddison (2001).
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Table 4.6. Composition of European overseas imports, 1513-1780
Panel A. Imports from Asia to Lisbon, 1513-1610 (% by weight)
1513-19 1523-31 1547-8 1587-8 1600-3 1608-10
Pepper 80.0 84.0 89.0 68.0 65 69.0
Other spices 18.4 15.6 9.6 11.6 16.2 10.9
Indigo 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.4 4.4 7.7
Textiles 0.2 0.0 0.0 10.5 12.2 7.8
Misc. 1.4 0.4 1.4 1.5 2.2 4.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
Panel B. Imports of VOC into Europe, 1619-1780 (% by invoice value)
1619-21 1648-50 1668-70 1698-1700 1738-40 1778-80
Pepper 56.5 50.4 30.5 11.2 8.1 9
Other spices 17.6 17.9 12.1 11.7 6.1 3.1
Textiles 16.1 14.2 36.5 54.7 41.1 49.5
Tea and coffee 4.2 32.2 27.2
Drugs, perfumes and dye-stuffs 9.8 8.5 5.8 8.3 2.8 1.8
Sugar 6.4 4.2 0.2 3.7 0.6
Saltpetre 2.1 5.1 3.9 2.6 4.4
Metals 0.1 0.5 5.7 5.3 1.1 2.7
Misc. 0.2 0.1 0.4 2.3 1.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100
Panel C. Imports of English East India Company into Europe, 1668-1760 (% of invoice value)
1668-70 1698-1700 1738-40 1758-60
Pepper 25.25 7.02 3.37 4.37
Textiles 56.61 73.98 69.58 53.51
Raw silk 0.6 7.09 10.89 12.27
Tea 0.03 1.13 10.22 25.23
Coffee 0.44 1.93 2.65
Indigo 4.25 2.82
Saltpetre 7.67 1.51 1.85 2.97
Misc. 5.15 4.52 1.44 1.65
Total 100 100 100 100
Panel D. Estimated annual sales of colonial imports, England and Netherlands, 1751-4
Total sales (1000 pesos) Percentage of sales
From Asia Of total
Textiles 6750 41.7 21.1
Pepper 1100 6.8 3.4
Tea 2800 17.3 8.7
Coffee 1000 6.2 3.1
Spices 1850 11.4 5.8
Misc. 2700 16.7 8.4
Total from Asia 16200 100.0 50.5
From America Of total
Sugar 8050 50.8 25.1
Tobacco 3700 23.3 11.5
Misc. 4100 25.9 12.8
Total from America 15850 100.0 49.5
Total overseas imports 32050 100.0
Source: Findlay and O’Rourke (2007, pp. 308-9).
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Figure 4.1. Numbers of ships sailing to Asia, per decade
Source: de Vries (2003).
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Figure 4.2. Spice markups, 1580-1890
(Amsterdam price / Southeast Asian price)
Source: Bulbeck et al. (1998).
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Figure 4.3. Anglo-American wheat trade, 1800-2000
Source: O'Rourke and Williamson (2005), p. 10.
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Figure 4.4. Spanish terms of trade vis-à-vis Britain 1714-1882 (1854 =100)
Source: Prados de la Escosura (mimeo).
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Figure 4.5. Demand versus supply during the Industrial Revolution
Source: Findlay and O’Rourke (2007), p. 306.
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